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Political Judgment for an Agonistic
Democracy
Albena Azmanova*
1.  The colonization of the economic and political systems by democratic 
deliberation
With a renewed ambition to salvage Enlightenment’s emancipatory promise amidst 
the rampant social crisis in Europe, the Council of Europe is poised to adopt the 
Charter on Shared Social Responsibilities (Council of Europe 2011). ‘Europe’, the 
authors of the Charter note, ‘seeks to secure equal access to fundamental rights, the 
ideal of universal social protection and a digniied life for all, enabling all individuals 
to freely develop their personality, retain control over their life, [and] participate 
in societal choices...’ he obstacles to the triumph of social and political justice 
are identiied as those ‘major social changes linked to widening inequalities, the 
loss of jobs resulting from company relocations and technological change in the 
absence of retraining and product innovation, the rise in employment insecurity for 
young people, overindebtedness and impoverishment of a growing proportion of 
households, and ageing of the population’, together with the depleted states’ capacity 
to ‘fulill their role of ensuring access to social protection, health care, education, 
housing and common goods in general’ (Ibid., 3). 
Democratic deliberations are given here pride of place among the policy tools 
for tackling the stated deiciencies of justice, as ‘shared decision-making based on 
impartial reasoning’ is deemed ‘essential in order to guarantee the principles of social, 
environmental and intergenerational justice’ (Ibid., 5). Deliberative policies (which 
are mentioned 17 times on this 20-page document)1 are an instrument to ‘combat 
poverty, insecurity, discrimination and widening inequalities in order to further 
develop and pass on to future generations a universal framework of inalienable and
1 By comparison, ‘equality’ is mentioned 3 times in the drat Charter.
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indivisible rights and common goods’ (Ibid.). hus, while the document is silent on 
the social responsibility of public authorities (at national and supra-national level) 
to provide the socio-economic conditions of justice, it is eloquent in prescribing 
forms of deliberative politics, emphasizing the need to ‘incorporate the negative 
externalities in economic deliberations’ (Ibid.), ‘encourage and legitimize new forms 
of deliberation’ (Ibid., 8) and build ‘renewed conidence in equitable social progress, 
on the basis of collective learning processes, deliberative democracy practices and 
new forms of partnership and multi-stakeholder and multi-level governance’ (Ibid., 
13). Chapter 2, which prescribes action strategies, names deliberative processes as 
one of the four envisaged strategies (alongside ‘innovation and learning process’, 
‘recognition of stakeholders’, and ‘forms of governance’—themselves based on 
deliberative processes). he Charter also makes a proud mention of the Social 
Cohesion Plan launched by the Council of Europe in 2010, whose purpose is 
summarized as ‘to foster the involvement of citizens and players in deining priorities 
and responsibilities by means of deliberative democracy’ (Ibid., 7).
his document, conceived ater broad public consultation at what is regarded 
to be an international institution with an outstanding democratic legitimacy, gives 
deliberative judgment a conspicuous centrality. his is suggestive of a signiicant 
shit in both democratic theory and policy practice—namely, a shit from the 
articulation of a distinct policy agenda crated ater a model of justice, with attendant 
policy measures for implementing it, to focusing on the very process of judgment, 
and especially deliberative judgment in democratic settings of inclusive dialogues. 
his faith in the ‘mild voice of reason’ (Bessette 1994) set in motion by deliberative 
judgment is commendable. However, unless we provide a robust account of the 
manner in which democratic deliberations are able to play such an emancipatory 
role (not least regarding the material conditions of social justice, as the Charter 
purports), we will have to submit that we might be witnessing the colonization of the 
political and economic systems by democratic deliberations, in an ironic reversal of 
Habermas’ diagnosis of late modernity’s malaise as ‘the colonization of the lifeworld 
by the economic and political systems’, a malaise deliberative politics were meant to 
cure.  
In this paper I critically examine the emancipatory potential of deliberative 
judgment. I begin by identifying three fallacies in authoritative accounts of 
the emancipatory capacity of such deliberations. I then ofer a recasting of the 
communicative turn in democratic theory in order to specify the conditions under 
which deliberative judgment can be reasonably expected to have an emancipatory 
efect. On this basis, I inally clarify the particular policy utility of democratic 
deliberations. 
2. The three conundrums of deliberative emancipation
Let us return to the drat Council of Europe Charter in order to identify the way 
in which democratic deliberations are expected to alleviate injustice. Deliberations’ 
redeeming power is stated to consist in their capacity to ‘reduce inequalities of 
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power and formulate preferences through reasoning and exchanges of views’ (Ibid., 
8). Giving equal voice to all afected parties in a process of free reasoning, in which 
otherwise disadvantaged groups are granted inluence through reasoned argument 
designates the particular emancipatory potential of democratic deliberations—a 
point of agreement among the various models of deliberative judgment crated by 
Jürgen Habermas, Joshua Cohen, Seyla Benhabib, Rainer Forst, John Dryzek, and Iris 
Young, among the plethora of scholars who have espoused deliberative democracy 
over the past two decades (as discussed in Knops 2006).
he conceptual laws of this account of the emancipatory power of democratic 
deliberations are of three kinds. he irst regards the relation between, on the one 
hand, the normative standard validating a rule and, on the other, the practice of 
this validation. he normative ideal of power-free deliberations is to allow, purely 
counterfactually, a judgment on the acceptability of a given norm: decisions on 
binding norms and rules are only legitimate ‘if they could be the object of free and 
reasoned agreement among equals’ (Cohen 1997, 73, italics added).
However, the actual process of reason-giving in the social practice of 
deliberations can never be completely free of power asymmetries and biases related 
to participants’ particular identities. Even if we accept the principle of deliberative 
legitimacy (measuring up adopted rules against ictional rules elaborated in ideal 
conditions of deliberation), this normative stance is of little help in designing social 
policy unless the social conditions of equality and rationality are in place to enable 
rational dialogues among free and equal participants. However, if these demanding 
conditions were efectively already in place, the issue of justice would hardly appear—
debates on justice start not in the abstract, but when speciic social conditions and 
practices cause experiences of harm against which claims of injustice are advanced. 
Were the material conditions of justice practically available, deliberations (as 
procedures for addressing injustice) would be without an object—as grievances 
about sufered injustice would not emerge. 
Let us call this weakness in the account of the emancipatory potential of 
deliberations the ‘ontological conundrum’. his conundrum consists in the fact 
that, in deliberative theories of justice, the availability of the empirical conditions 
of justice (such as equality and mutual respect among participants) serves as 
(idealizing) presuppositions for the legitimacy of democratic deliberations as a 
normative ideal—what needs to obtain is presupposed to be already there in the 
very procedure through which it is to be obtained. hus, when the ontology of 
a just society (free of political conlict over the justice of social arrangements) is 
presupposed in normative accounts of justice, a pernicious circularity emerges that 
puts into question the political usefulness of such theories of justice and judgment. 
In other words, if our normative goal is a political reality of justice, free of power 
inequalities, we cannot aford to introduce such a conlict-free political ontology 
as a constitutive element of the normative theory. he same goes for assumptions 
about the cognitive and moral capacities of individuals, as deliberative theory 
commonly prescribes. Such assumption might sound nice, but as Immanuel Kant 
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has noted in his political writings, they are unsafe when applied to political matters; 
as he contends, the just political order must be possible to attain ‘even for a race of 
devils’—the categorical moral imperative (or its equivalents regarding the cognitive 
capacities of individuals) is out of place in such a venture.2
he second fallacy in authoritative accounts of the emancipatory power of 
democratic deliberations concerns the tension between the norms’ public acceptance 
in a process of inclusive reason-giving and their acceptability as just norms (i.e., 
norms compliant with a universal notion of Right). Let us name this the ‘acceptability 
conundrum’. his problem has been debated at length, without a solution, by John 
Rawls and Jürgen Habermas in an exchange they held between 1995 and 1997 about 
the merits of their respective models of communicative public reason.3 In essence, 
while they reproach each other that their continued reliance on ideal conditions 
(such as the ‘original position’ in the case of Rawls and the ‘ideal speech situation’ 
in the case of Habermas) reduces both the democratic credentials and the practical 
applicability of their models of deliberative politics, they both concede that liting all 
restrictions on deliberations would mean equating, unduly, the acceptability of rules 
as just with their mere public acceptance as binding. he consensual and inclusive 
nature of rule making alone cannot guarantee the justice of adopted rules. 
 his persisting tension between the rules’ public acceptance and their 
normative acceptability points to what I have described as ‘the paradox of judgment’ 
that is haunting much of normative political philosophy. he paradox is this: the 
higher we set our normative standards, the more we lose grip on political reality—at 
the expense of judgment’s critical power; yet, the more we weaken our normative 
criteria for the sake of enhancing the model’s political relevance, the more the model 
of justice loses its critical power and with it—its political cogency. (Azmanova 
2012a). hus, while the abstract ideal of freedom might easily be discarded as 
unrealistic because all legitimate power implies repression, getting rid of the notion 
of freedom leaves us without a gauge to establish what is an acceptable form or level 
of repression. 
 In deliberative democratic theory the judgment paradox takes the following 
shape: in order to enhance the democratic credentials of a theory of justice, we must 
entrust the deliberating public with the design of binding rules. Yet, as practically 
everything can come out of democratic deliberations, such an approach leaves us 
without means for a critical stance on publicly approved norms. We need, therefore, 
independent validity criteria to ensure that justice be not equated with whatever the 
people might be pleased to endorse. hus, theorists of deliberative democracy have 
sought, be it half-heartedly, a recourse to ideal theory (concerning the cognitive 
and moral capacities of participants, or describing the procedure of deliberation) in 
order to secure the justice of adopted rules. With such a move, however, the models 
2 Kant makes this methodological observation in his essay ‘he Perpetual Peace’. Here Kant discusses peace 
in terms of lack of the reasons for conlict—thus, his object is political justice. He cautions that, in analyses of 
political phenomena reliance on assumptions about the moral nature of individuals is out of place.
3 he exchange appeared in the following sequence: Habermas 1995, Rawls 1995, Habermas 1998, Rawls 1997.
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of justice and judgment become politically unrealistic and therefore—futile. 
he third weakness in the account of the emancipatory power of democratic 
deliberations concerns the type of emancipation that such deliberations are meant 
to achieve. Even if deliberations were to be conducted in perfect conditions 
(approximating Habermas’ ‘ideal speech situation’), giving equal voice to all afected 
parties would remedy only injustices related to the unequal distribution of power 
within the model of wellbeing participants inhabit. However, since the procedural 
conditions of validity concern the elimination of power inequalities, it is far from 
certain that such deliberations would also be able to address forms of domination 
related to the very nature of the model of wellbeing—beyond the injustice of inequality 
and exclusion. I will refer to this weakness as the ‘forms of domination conundrum’. 
Let me explain this more carefully, taking as a point of departure an example.  
A gender parity law ensuring a 50 per cent quota for women in politics was 
promulgated in France in 2001—it obliged all political parties to present an equal 
number of male and female candidates in elections. he typical justiication of the 
law ran along the logic of equality. As Denise Fuschs, head of the European Women’s 
Lobby put it, ‘Human beings are not abstract, they are men or they are women, so 
having a 50–50 system is a relection of the way things really are’.4
he law is typical of policy measures aiming to remedy the unequal distribution 
of power between men and women by ensuring their equal access to, and equal 
positioning within, the political and economic spheres of modern societies. However, 
the relative success of such strategies targeting inclusion and equality within the 
model of wellbeing typical of modern capitalist democracies (with its stress on 
obtaining social status through paid work) has come at a price. Not only has this 
model of wellbeing remained unquestioned, but, by serving as a telos in women’s 
struggles for emancipation from domesticity, it has gained additional value.5 In this 
way, as Nancy Fraser has noted, the struggles for women’s access to the labor market 
has made the feminist movement complicit with the productivist logic of capitalism, 
giving enhanced legitimacy and impetus to what Luc Boltanski has described as the 
lexible, ‘networked’ capitalism of the late twentieth century (Fraser 2009). Struggles 
for numerical equality among the sexes—be it in the economic or political spheres 
divert attention away from structural deiciencies inlicting these spheres—the highly 
elitist nature of recruitment into institutionalized politics in France (as in the earlier 
example), or the increasing commodiication of labour in the case of neoliberal, 
‘networked’ capitalism. 
Regulations enforcing gender parity target what I call ‘relational domination’—
domination resulting from the unequal distribution of power among actors. 
Injustice, from this perspective, emerges in terms of power asymmetries that allow 
4 Quoted in ‘French Women Taking Politics into heir Hands’, International Herald Tribune (Feb. 12, 2001). 
he European Women’s Lobby is an umbrella organization of about three thousand feminist associations.
5 In a similar move, one of the most prominent slogan of the Spanish Indignados (the young Spaniards 
protesting since the summer of 2011 against the pathological lack of employment) read: ‘We are not against 
the system; the system is against us’.
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one group to dominate another, and its remedy would necessitate equalization of 
power relations. However, relational domination is oten but an epiphenomenon of 
what I have named ‘structural domination’—domination to which all social actors 
are subjected by force of the operative logic of the socio-economic system they 
inhabit. (Azmanova 2012a, 48). hus, women who efectively gained access to the 
labor market were not only subjected to the dynamics of commodiication endemic 
to capitalism, but also reduced the bargaining power of labor by increasing the 
volume of the labor force (thereby alleviating the threat for obstructing production 
that labor poses to capital). hus, while women’s exclusion from the labor market is 
an instance of relational domination, their inclusion would remedy the particular 
power asymmetry while leaving intact the structural injustice of ever-increasing 
labor commodiication in the context of globally integrated capitalism.  
Let me make at this point a meta-theoretical disambiguation. he return of 
attention I am pleading here to the structural imperatives of the social system does 
not mean I am taking the side of the system in the tired ‘system versus rational 
action’ debate—a position that allegedly leaves no room for agency.6 To recognize 
that there are powerful structural factors at work (or systemic logic) is not to argue 
that actors are prisoners of the iron laws of history. It is rather to help us appreciate 
the magnitude of the challenge of emancipation. 
he political struggle of the Let in the twentieth century has predominantly 
targeted the relational dimension of domination: intellectually and politically, the 
critical enterprise was directed against disparities in social status, political voice and 
access to resources; it has sought to eliminate status hierarchies, economic inequality, 
and political subordination. When the source of social sufering is detected to be 
power asymmetries, the equalization of power relations, in order to ensure equal 
participation in social life, emerges as an appropriate remedy. Emancipation, from 
this perspective, stands in terms of participatory parity. his is the light in which 
the emancipatory power of democratic deliberations is usually identiied: giving an 
equal voice to all afected parties in the design of binding for them social norms 
and political rules would, allegedly, ensure the justice of the socio-political order. 
However, as the unwitting cooptation of feminist struggles for parity by neoliberal 
capitalism signals, we cannot be conident that combatting relational domination 
necessarily entails uprooting structural domination. 
It might be that democracy is constitutively prone to over-stating the relational 
forms of domination and overlook the structural ones. To the extent that equality 
6 At its best, this line of critique is displayed in Axel Honneth’s discussion of Foucault and Habermas where 
he observes that Foucault’s systems-theoretic analysis of power leads him to view power is an all-embracing 
and self-perpetuating property of the social system rather than as the product of the struggle among strategic 
actors. In contrast, he endorses Habermas’ concept of communicative interaction among rational agents as 
a way out of the philosophical-historical dead-end of systems theory (as well as of critical theory infected 
by Adorno’s negativism). (Honneth 1991). Although analyses directed at system/structure vs. rational actor 
explanations of humanity’s predicament have a good propaedeutic value (as introductions to complex 
analyses), I consider the structure-agency debate to be based on a false dichotomy and therefore not to be of 
great use analytically.
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of citizenship is deinitional for democracy, democracy is naturally averse to 
inequalities—these are constitutively a threat to the social order of democratic 
societies, especially of liberal democracies whose main pledge is to equality of liberty. 
Moreover, with the recent advent of deliberative democracy (since the 1980s), ‘for 
contemporary democratic theorists, democracy is largely a matter of deliberation’, as 
John Dryzek (2005, 218) has observed. Having emerged within democratic theory, 
conceptualizations of deliberative judgment thus inherit the former’s exclusive 
concern with power-equalization, rather than, say, with the political economy of 
capitalism and the operative logic of proit creation which are sources of structural 
domination beyond disparities of power. 
In what follows, I will propose strategies for addressing the three conundrums 
in the account of the emancipatory power of democratic deliberations. In other 
words, we need to account for the emancipatory potency of deliberative judgment 
(1) without a reliance on ideal theory describing the conditions of deliberation, (2) 
while solving the tension between the acceptance of thus adopted rules and their 
acceptability as being just, (3) as well as clarifying the capacity of deliberations to 
unveil the common structural sources of conlicting grievances of injustice.
3. Solving the ontological conundrum: getting rid of ideal theory
he ontological conundrum consists in the latent existence of a conlict-free political 
ontology under the guise of idealizing presuppositions (e.g. about the rationality, 
equality, or authenticity of participants) describing the conditions of validity of 
adopted norms and rules. While such idealizing presuppositions do efectively 
secure the normative rigour of a theory of justice, they diminish the theory’s political 
usefulness (the ‘paradox of judgment’ curse mentioned above)—as all battles over the 
justice of the shared social order are permeated by power inequalities and valid (and 
oten valuable) diferences, the sterile ideal conditions demanded by a normative 
theory render it politically inapplicable, if not dangerous. As Richard Rorty has put 
it, abstract foundational principles in ethics look bad because ‘they never helped 
anyone who actually had a diicult problem, and all they could possibly do is just 
serve to abbreviate a set of moral intuitions’ (Rorty 1998, 15). 
 As a matter of methodological lucidity, therefore, a theory of political judgment 
should not allow, be it inadvertently, its normative goals to permeate its ontological 
premises (as is oten the case in deliberative theories of democracy).7 In other words, 
as welcome as notions of individual autonomy, rationality and equality might be 
in their role of normative standards, they should be explicitly excluded from the 
theory’s underlying political ontology. We cannot postulate the ontological existence 
of free and equal individuals as premises in the model of deliberative justiication 
7 In the case of Habermas, the ‘idealising pressupositions’ about a conlict-free political reality that are implicit 
in the ‘ideal speech situation’ are a logical consequence of the requirement for immanency of critique (itself 
constitutive for critical theory of Frankfurt School pedigree), which compels Habermas to draw normative 
criteria from the necessary presuppositions underlying the human practices of (non-strategic) communication 
oriented towards mutual understanding. I cannot expound further on this here. (See Azmanova 2012a, Ch. 2). 
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if autonomy and equality are to be desired outcomes of judgment. Solving the 
ontological conundrum would therefore require abandoning ideal theories of justice 
in favour of a realistic political ontology. (Or, in a less radical move, combining 
a minimally deontological notion of justice—for instance, what Rainer Forst has 
conceptualized as ‘the basic right to justiication’ (Forst 2010 & 2011), with a realist 
ontology of politics.) Such realist ontology rests on a notion of political dynamics 
as being activated by conlicts over society’s normative order—conlicts that are 
themselves rooted in individuals’ embeddedness in a social reality of inequality and 
domination. 
 To avoid a misunderstanding: I am neither refuting the normative validity 
of ‘ideal’ theories of justice, nor am I espousing an account of social interactions 
as exclusively a matter of conlict, rather than cooperation. In tune with Kant’s 
warning against the unsafe nature of idealizing presuppositions (irrespectively of 
their veracity), I am advocating an espousal of an antagonistic model of politics 
(Kant’s ‘race of devils’) for methodological reasons—for the sake of avoiding the 
futile circularity of achieving our normative aspirations simply by means of allowing 
these aspirations to describe the conditions of achieving them. It is in this sense 
(as a matter of methodological lucidity, as I noted) that I propose to replace the 
unsafe idealizing presuppositions about a conlict-free political reality underlying 
the process of justiication, with a realistic ontology of radical, antagonistic conlict, 
generated by antagonistic social positions within which actors interact and make 
sense of their world. 
 Not only is the cleansing of power asymmetries, particular identities and 
cognitive biases from the process of deliberation impossible, it is also undesirable. 
hese partialities and biases are oten exactly what is at stake in grievances about 
injustice.8 If we put aside interests and partialities as ‘biases’ to be neutralized by 
appropriate procedures and principles, the normative theory is bound to render 
itself politically irrelevant—those biases are part of agents’ self-understanding and 
motivate their entering justice debates in the irst place.
 he endorsement of a political ontology of radical conlict changes the 
purpose of the inquiry—we should be able to account for the emancipatory power 
of deliberative justiication from the premises of a non-ideal world in which social 
dynamics of cooperation-within-conlict trigger the political dynamics of norm-
contestation (Azmanova 2012a, Ch1). It is the contestation of the norms stabilizing 
the conlict-ridden social order that prompts justice debates in the irst place. 
 Here a clariication is in order concerning the relationship between politics, 
governance, and the proper function of judgment. he political (in French le 
politique rather than la politique) originates in conlicts over social practices and 
norms; politics is the management of such conlicts. In contrast, governance is the 
8 As Seyla Benhabib has argued against the Rawlsian move to exclude the ‘background culture’ from the 
sphere of public reason’s operation, grievances related to background culture (such as identity recognition 
related to religious belief, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation) can be urgent issues of justice (Benhabib 2002, 
108-112).
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realm of (conlict-free) application of norms agreed as binding. Political judgment 
is the bridge between the realm of the political and the realm of governance as, via 
a process of norm-construction and norm-validation, judgment puts an end, be it 
provisionally, to political contestation, thus enabling the transition from politics to 
governance (Azmanova 2012a, 23).
 his transition from the realm of conlict to the realm of rule implementation 
passes through contestation of the normative order of society in which all concerned 
parties are mutually involved. his is valid even for societies marked by radical 
conlicts because, as John Dewey oten noted, debates on justice do not start in the 
abstract—the question of justice only arises in normative conlicts within shared 
practices, when the norms governing these practices are challenged as being unjust 
(Dewey 1969). Even deeply divided societies are constituted by social practices in 
which participants are involved with each other in dynamics of cooperation-within-
conlict. he conlict itself is a political engagement within a social relationship. Any 
contestation of the shared social order entails judgment, on the part of all concerned 
parties, of the practices and rules that are being contested.9
Deliberative judgment, from such a ‘realist’ point of view, is not a tool for 
crating a consensus on just norms but rather a mechanism allowing actors holding 
antagonistic positions to enter into a dialogical contestation of the existing social 
order. his contestation is prompted not because of some deontologically postulated 
right to justiication, but because the very mutual entanglement of actors in shared 
social practices necessitates their engagement in a contestation and defence of the 
social order they inhabit—thus, the impulse of mutual justiication is contained in 
the fact of radical conlict within shared social practices. (It is in this sense that 
what Forst has described as the ‘right to justiication’ can be derived as an idealizing 
presupposition of social practices and attendant political dynamics of conlict).10 
I will come back to this point in order to account for the transition deliberative 
judgment enables from antagonistic conlict to agonistic pluralism in complex 
modern democracies.11
4. Solving the acceptability conundrum: a negative ideal of justice 
he fallacy I named ‘the acceptability conundrum’ stems from predicating the validity 
of norms on consensus—consensus that tends to equate the norms’ acceptability 
with their acceptance, thereby eliminating the critical distance towards validated 
norms. Habermas and Rawls undertake to solve the tension between the factual 
9 Radical disruption rarely leads to normative changes exactly because of the lacking mutual engagement 
among all the parties in a conlict.
10 For such ‘sociological’ grounding of the right to justiication see Azmanova 2012b.
11 I follow here Chantal Moufe’s position that the main task for democracy is to convert antagonism 
into agonism, enemies into adversaries, ighting into critical engagement. However, while she holds that 
deliberation is unit for such a task because it is incapable of processing deep diference, in my account 
deliberative judgment can be one such transformative mechanism (of antagonism into agonism). See Moufe 
1999; 2000a; 2000b.
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acceptance of rules and their acceptability (as being just) by stipulating that the 
consensus in question needs to be achieved under demanding ideal conditions. his 
solution, however, leads to the ‘judgment paradox’ discussed above—a heavy load 
of ideal theory is introduced to secure the acceptability of norms, which renders the 
model of judgment politically unrealistic and therefore useless. 
he acceptability conundrum could be solved by means of redeining the 
normative goals of critique. I propose shiting the normative perspective from deining 
and achieving justice (in the abstract terms of moral universalism) to efectively 
addressing injustice. From a critical theory perspective12, addressing injustice is a 
matter of achieving emancipation from structurally produced oppression in order 
to liberate human beings from the particular circumstances that enslave them 
(Horkheimer 2002). Hence, the emancipatory goals of deliberative politics are to be 
delineated not by the habitual liberal vision of an unencumbered, autonomous self, 
but in terms of individual and collective emancipation from structurally generated, 
historically speciic conditions of domination, thematized as injustice in actors’ 
grievances of sufering.13
he notion of emancipation, thus redeined, entails also a revision of the 
standard of validity for assessing adopted norms and rules. Rather than postulating 
the ideals of a just society on which a consensus is deliberatively either produced or 
achieved (in the various formats of deliberative public reason), the validity of policy 
measures can be assessed in terms of the extent to which they alleviate sufering—
i.e. the extent to which they are an efective response to the social sufering that has 
sparked the debates of justice.14
Within a model of judgment guided by the principle of critical relevance, gender 
equality provides poor justiication to the French law on gender parity in politics—
to take the example already used. his is the case because gender is not relevant 
to the distribution of political oice, in the way, for instance, citizenship or age is. 
However, the law inds stronger justiication when its validity is tested on grounds of 
the alleviation of (social) harm. From this perspective, the proper normative grounds 
for the French parity law would not be the allegedly ‘natural’ equal ratio of men to 
women. he law is justiied to the extent that it provides a solution to a situation 
of historical injustice in French society—namely the systematic marginalization of 
12 I have in mind here critical theory of Frankfurt School origin, which is ultimately concerned with the 
sociostructural dynamics of injustice, that is, dynamics concerning the structural sources of political order.
13 hese grievances cannot be taken on their face value; their status is only as an empirical entry point 
of critique. I cannot address here in detail the dynamics of immanent critique, which I have discussed in 
Azmanova 2012c.
14 I have named this the ‘principle of critical relevance’ as it corresponds to the urgent nature of the political 
from which debates on justice originate. his principle speciies the epistemic basis of validity of norms. 
It is neither the ‘true’ and the ‘rational’ (Habermas) or the ‘reasonable’ (Rawls) but the ‘critically relevant’: 
what divergent evaluative perspectives see as relevant in the critical sense of qualifying as an object of as an 
object of   disagreement. his allows the issue of justice to be approached hermeneutically (i.e., as a question 
of injustice). he idea of relevance I advance implies a correspondence between the principles that guide 
practices, on the one hand, and, on the other, speciic societal concerns of injustice, concerns that critically 
(as opposed to instrumentally) motivate these practices. See Azmanova 2012a, 194.  
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women in the labor market, including in politics.15 However, the principle of critical 
relevance would deprive a gender parity law of validity, should such a law be adopted 
in a context that has not been stained by gender discrimination. Moreover, when 
deliberative judgment is guided by the principle of critical relevance, it will be led to 
examine not the numerical inequality between men and women, but the way gender 
has become relevant to the distribution of political oice—namely via a historically 
speciic pattern of exclusion and power asymmetries (relational domination).16 
his questioning of the way claims to justice achieve political relevance would 
then bring to the light the fact that power inequalities between men and women 
in the distribution of public oice are akin to other forms of relational domination 
that the law in question obliterates—for instance, the limited access of citizens of 
North African origin to professional politics in France, despite them constituting 
a numerically signiicant minority among French citizens. hus, while the original 
grievance of gender discrimination serves as an empirical entry point of critique 
into dynamics of reasoning that would lead to the discovering of a broader pattern 
of injustice. 
he change in the normative grounds of validity (along the principle of ‘critical 
relevance’) goes hand in hand with a change in the epistemic grounds of discursive 
agreement and disagreement. Here I come to the clariication of the possibility 
for antagonistic positions to enter into a dialogical contestation of norms. For 
a normative contestation to be at all possible, the parties to the conlict must be 
in agreement on what are the relevant issues of disagreement. he possibility for 
competing claims to justice to enter into dialogue does not imply a prior substantive 
consensus (as thin as it might be) on valid rules, rather, it implies an overlapping 
shared understanding of a cognitive nature—a shared understanding of the meaning 
of disagreement—what Arendt calls a ‘consistency of arguing and reasoning’.17 Due 
to their involvement in shared social practices (be it from antagonistic positions) 
actors develop what I have described as ‘orientational phronesis’—the practical 
wisdom that allows them to discern issues as being relevant to public life. On the 
basis of shared orientational phronesis, the particular objects of judgment that are 
introduced via the various grievances of injustice appear to participants as signiicant 
15 In 1995, then Prime Minister Alain Juppé dismissed eight of the twelve women ministers he had hired 
six months earlier. his act drew attention to the status of women in politics, making this a relevant issue 
for debates on justice. he highly visible gesture of disrespect for women in politics created a public feeling 
of injustice to which the law, passed in early 2001, was a reaction. It was not an act of the ‘discovery’ of an 
authentic situation of numerical equality among men and women.
16 Oten the right to be elected preceded the right to vote as the former was granted to women from the 
ruling upper classes. Among the most ardent opponents of woman sufrage in Spain were two female deputies 
(Margarita Nelken and Victoria Kent), who argued that giving women the vote would endanger the Second 
Republic because, they claimed, women in Spain at that time were too ignorant and immature to vote 
responsibly. his reveals that power asymmetries based on gender masked asymmetries based on class (as 
women from the upper classes could run for public oice).
17 ‘If [. . .] we assure ourselves that we still understand each other’, writes Arendt, ‘we do not mean that 
together we understand a world common to us all, but that we understand the consistency of arguing and 
reasoning’. (Arendt 1993, 96, italics added).
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(noteworthy) issues demanding their judgment. hus, deliberations proceed as 
making-sense-in-common, engendering an emergent (in the course of deliberations) 
shared understanding of what is at stake—a shared perception about what qualiies 
as a valid grievance. he early stages of deliberations usually establish such a shared 
matrix of relevance.18 he tacit articulation of what is critically relevant (noteworthy) 
is in this sense constitutive of the public sphere; it demarcates it. 
Grievances of injustice, from which debates on justice usually originate, are 
able to become a focus of debates on justice because such grievances put to question 
what ‘public sense’ (in Arendt’s terms) holds to be of critical relevance for the 
public engaged in discussions of justice—issues that radically challenge and risk to 
destabilize the normative order of society and, thus, claim public attention. Typically, 
this process begins from a speciic claim to injustice regarding a society’s constitutive 
rule and proceeds as a generalization of the scope of applicability of that grievance.
Let me illustrate this process of generalization with another example of 
legal battles in France—those which lead to the adoption of the law on registered 
partnerships (Pacte Civile de Solidarité) in 1999. Homosexuals’ claims to the right 
to marry triggered a signiicant debate in France in the late 1990s. he grievance 
which generated the debate was that denying gay men the right to marry had 
entailed a symbolic devaluation (through exclusion) of homosexuals, and entailed 
economic losses for them as they were denied the economic advantages that married 
couples legally have. hese claims focused public attention in an urgent manner 
as basic, socially constitutive, norms (regarding family life) were being questioned. 
Within a year the debate changed its terms, as non-married heterosexual couples 
voiced the grievance that they were also being denied social recognition (of their 
commitment to each other), as well as economic advantages. he terms of the debate 
were thus generalized as the claim to injustice found its range of relevance beyond 
the homosexual/heterosexual dichotomy, thus evolving into the justice claim that 
any two people who have undertaken a commitment to each other in forming a 
family (irrespective of sexual proile) should beneit from all of the legal rights that 
a marriage certiicate confers. 
It was deliberative judgment (as the case was debated in a series of deliberative 
forums) that transformed the initially antagonistic positions regarding marriage 
into an agonistic pluralism of compatible (in their shared understanding of the 
matter as an issue of justice) views that, in a process of ‘making sense in common’ 
converged in their eforts to ind a solution to what came to be seen as a general 
pattern of injustice surpassing the initial grievance that had triggered the debate. he 
outcome of these debates was not a consensus on a distinct norm vested in the law 
of registered partnerships; public deliberations’ outcome was the articulation of the 
need to revisit the notion of the family and its legal status, as well as the articulation 
of the basis on which public authority was to act—namely, not remedying an injustice 
to homosexual couples, but providing non-exclusive terms of legal protection to 
18 Which I have described as a ‘phronetic constitution of public reason’ (Azmanova 2012a, 157-166).
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the family. On the basis of such an agreement, deliberatively generated, the French 
parliament then adopted the Pacte Civile de Solidarité.19
What does that tell us about the nature of public deliberations and their status 
among the policy instruments used in liberal democracies? Deliberative reasoning 
about the justice of contested norms of social cooperation does not, and need 
not, result in a consensus on binding rules. Such reasoning resolves normative 
disagreement of two types—(1) disagreement over what are relevant policy concerns 
and (2) what are the valid grounds for public authority’s making policy decisions—
the right grounds on which public authority can act. It is in this way that deliberative 
judgment functions as a mechanism transforming the antagonistic positions of 
conlict (from the sphere of the political) into an agonistic mutual engagement in a 
dispute over the proper normative grounds for policy action.
5. Solving the forms of domination conundrum: agonistic judgment
he ‘forms of domination’ conundrum concerns the tendency to seek the emancipatory 
power of deliberative democracy exclusively in terms of power equalization and 
inclusion. his, as I noted, obscures what I described as ‘structural domination’—the 
actors’ subordination to the operative logic of the system, domination to which are 
subjected also the winners in the relational distribution of power. 
From a critical theory perspective, normative criticism is not just a matter of 
continual contestation of binding norms and political rules for the sake of equality 
and inclusion, but is above all a matter of disclosing the sociostructural sources 
of injustice. his means that the emancipatory power of democratic deliberations 
should be sought also in their capacity to disclose the common structural sources of 
injustice behind antagonistic claims to justice. Can deliberative agonistic judgment, 
thus understood efectively disclose to participants the deep structural roots of their 
seemingly incompatible grievances?20
Drawing on empirical research on deliberative polls, I have argued that 
democratic deliberation can efectively bring to public visibility the structural 
sources of injustice (Azmanova 2012a, Ch.9). he mechanism of such a deliberative 
disclosure of structural domination is diferent from what Habermas has described 
as ‘the better argument’ dynamics of justiication—a process of mutual reason-giving 
that generates a consensus on basic rights. Instead, I discern a process of critical 
justiication I call ‘rendering account’. How does this work? 
It is exactly because deliberations are invariably marked by participants’ 
social identities that the mutual reason-giving takes place as intersubjective (rather 
19 Eventually same-sex marriage became legal in France on 18 May 2013 when the law was promulgated ater 
the Constitutional Council upheld it against the challenge mounted by the conservative UMP party.
20 My account of deliberative judgment’s applicability in situations of antagonistic conlict is akin, in spirit, 
to John Dryzek’s (2005, 218). However, while he is concerned with deep-seated identity conlicts, my concern 
is with what I have described here as structural domination and issues of social justice underlying identity 
conlicts.
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than interpersonal)21 dynamics of interaction between social subjects, subjects 
diferentially positioned within the structure of social relations, but mutually related 
through this structure (as are employed and employers related in the dynamics of 
employment). To the extent that public deliberations involve the full range of socio-
cultural diversity in society, they can be regarded as giving expression, in a dialogical 
form, of the larger dynamics of social interactions taking place in societies. hus, 
the only procedural requirement is that of the full representation of society’s socio-
cultural proile (which in deliberative polls is ensured by random representative 
sampling). Such representation would enable the disclosure of the full range of social 
antagonism.   
In the modus of ‘rendering account’, mutual justiication proceeds as a process 
in which claims are directed inwardly, so to speak: participants do not present 
arguments in defense of their positions, they give account of the reasons for the 
positions they hold by disclosing their experiences of injustice. hus, actors disclose 
the reasons for having reasons, that is, the second-order reasons related to who these 
actors socially are, reasons related to a person’s position in the distribution of social 
status.
 In this way ‘rendering account’ discloses the link between what Pierre 
Bourdieu called ‘prise de position’ and ‘position’: one’s taking a position in a dispute, 
and one’s social position.22 In this process participants come to realize how their 
particular social positioning vis-à-vis one another in the structure of social relations 
is at the root of their disagreement. Ultimately, by disclosing the relational nature of 
the competing claims to justice, this process is likely to generate an understanding 
among participants of their mutual entanglement in the socio-structural production 
of injustice, thus allowing them to gain a view of the larger parameters of structural 
domination, irrespective of where they might be standing in the stratiied distribution 
of power. 
  his understanding of agonistic judgment changes the status of democratic 
deliberations. heir function consists in enabling access to what I called the 
‘structural’ dimension of domination by triggering a disclosure of the social origin 
of lived experiences of sufering. Due to these dynamics, the public sphere becomes 
a space for communicative enacting of social conlicts. It is here that antagonistic 
positions transform into agonistic relations, rooted in the shared awareness of the 
way agents are similarly subjected to forms of structural domination.
6. Conclusion: on the emancipatory potential of agonistic judgment
I ofered a recasting of the communicative turn in democratic theory in which the 
(counterfactual) reliance on ideal conditions of deliberation is substituted by an 
account of the very social hermeneutics of justiication in the clash of antagonistic 
21 Not interactions among individuals as unique persons, but as social subjects (marked by their particular 
place in the distribution of social competences).
22 He uses this distinction is a number of works. See, for instance, Bourdieu 1979.
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positions contesting society’s normative order. he emancipatory vocation of 
democratic deliberations in the modus of ‘agonistic judgment’ I adumbrated 
consists in the following: deliberations are to enable a disclosure of the way patterns 
of relational dominations are rooted in a larger pattern of structural domination, 
and to give, accordingly, a binding mandate to public authority for policy action 
against structural domination. Deployed in contemporary debates on justice—from 
gender inequality (the subordination of women in the workplace) to unsustainable 
growth (entailing both economic inequalities and ecological degradation)—such 
deliberations are likely to make it clear that neither proper inclusion of women in 
the labour market, nor remedial distribution of income, could be cogent solutions to 
the current social malaise of capitalist democracies. 
Seemingly unrelated, and oten mutually opposed, grievances of injustice form 
cognitive connections in the course of public debates—connections shedding a light 
on their common origin in the operative logic of the social system. It is unlikely that, 
when the negative externalities of production are included in economic deliberations, 
as the drat Council of Europe Charter on Shared Social Responsibilities prescribes, 
this will result in more than an increase in the products’ price. However, if grievances 
of environmental degradation are pitted against those of developing nations’ urgent 
need for economic growth, the very clash of seemingly irreconcilable claims is likely 
to draw out from the shadows of disagreement the compelling demands of globally 
integrated capitalism—which not only pillages nature, but deines what a valid need 
is—e.g. the purported needs of developing nations for urbanization and mass-scale 
agriculture as propagated by development aid policies.
his account of deliberative judgment is more strongly focused on the practical 
process of conlicting contestations of the social order, than on delineating the ideal 
conditions of consensus-building. With this, it has a better chance to satisfy the 
double imperative for political realism and social criticism.
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